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EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS BY THE UNITED STATES
Gerald L. Neuman'
INTRODUCTION
Affluent nations' perception of a refugee crisis has led them to ex-
plore various methods for preventing refugees from entering their refu-
gee processing systems from the outset.' These strategies often include
shifting the scene of encounters with refugees to the high seas or to the
territory of poorer neighbors, thereby raising the question of the extent
to which a state can liberate itself from legal obligations by transferring
its operations outside its borders.2 This Article explores one version of
that question: international human rights constraints on the return of ref-
ugees stopped outside the territory of the returning nation. Because the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the primary nonrefoulement obligation
contained in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees3
does not apply extraterritorially, this Article will concentrate on
nonrefoulement obligations that arise from sources other than the Refu-
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. I owe thanks to Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Edith Friedler, Claudio Grossman, and above all to Louis Henkin. I should dis-
close that I have advised counsel for Haitian refugees, and have written amicus briefs in
support of thple aintiffs in the Haitian Centers Council litigation.
1. David A. Martin, Strategies for a Resistant World: Human Rights Initiatives
and the Need for Alternatives to Refugee Interdiction, 26 CORNELL I,'L L.J. 753.
754 (1993); Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and
the German Asylum Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503 (1993).
2. Under the United States Constitution, the answer appears to be yes, some-
times. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that U.S.
agents' search of a nonresident alien's home in Mexico was not governed by the
Fourth Amendment); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE LJ. 909,
971-76 (1991) (analyzing Verdugo-Urquidez).
3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 19
U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
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gee Convention, in particular, the Convention Against Torture4 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'
I. NONREFOULEMENT AS A RIGHT, REMEDY, AND RULE
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The French verb "refouler," and the noun "refoulement," are used in
international law to describe the unacceptable return of an individual to
a country where she faces serious mistreatment. They are commonly
associated with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol, 6 which contain the particular prohibition of
refoulement to a place where an individual faces persecution on one of
the five Refugee Convention grounds! The two terms may also be
used, however, in connection with other norms prohibiting return due to
other forms of anticipated mistreatment! This Article will use the term
"refoulement" in its generic sense, as well as in the technical senses that
particular legal contexts refine for it.
It will be useful to begin by considering three different ways of
thinking about obligations not to engage in refoulement: as independent
human rights, as remedies for violations of human rights, and as rules
of state responsibility for violations of human rights. One may conceive
of the right of nonrefoulement under the Refugee Convention as a dis-
tinct legal right not derived from any other legal right or set of rights.
To say that a refugee fears persecution in her country of nationality
does not require a determination that the country of nationality is violat-
ing a human right guaranteed by customary international law or by a
4. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/RF_S/391708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Covenant].
6. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating the substantive provisions of the Convention,
but making them applicable to a broader class of refugees). The United States is a
party to the Protocol, not to the original Convention. Id.
7. See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33 at 176 (providing that "[n]o
Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoev-
er to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion").
8. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
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treaty to which that country is a party. Indeed, the Refugee Convention
came so early in the development of binding international human rights
law after the Second World War,9 that few refugees would have been
protected if that had been a criterion. As an independent legal right, the
scope of the right of nonrefoulement may vary with the particular instru-
ment (or customary rule) under which it arises, as may the relationship
that must exist between an individual and a state before the individual
can assert the right against that state.
Alternatively, we may think of nonrefoulement as a remedial rule,
supplementing the individual's self-help remedy of flight to escape se-
vere human rights violations in her own country. The inability of refu-
gees to obtain protection of their rights from their own country provides
a traditional justification for assigning a duty of protection to another
country." The obligation of a specific state to afford that protection
may derive from a particular instrument like the Refugee Convention, or
from more general rules concerning the scope of a state's obligation to
protect human rights. This approach construes nonrefoulement as an
affirmative act by the state for the individual's benefit.
Finally, we may think of nonrefoulement as a rule concerning state
responsibility for violations of human rights. States must refrain from
refoulement in order to avoid complicity in serious human rights viola-
tions committed by others. A state that knowingly (or with awareness of
sufficient risk) compels an individual to return to a country where her
rights will be violated is not merely neglecting to protect her, but helps
cause the violation. This approach emphasizes the active character of
refoulement. The state's obligation to refrain from refoulement may
derive from a particular instrument like the Refugee Convention, or from
more general rules regarding a state's responsibility for the consequences
of its actions.
9. Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 6-11 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
10. See JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 124 (1991) (explain-
ing that "refugee law is designed to interpose the protection of the international com-
munity only in situations where there is no reasonable expectation that adequate na-
tional protection of core human rights will be forthcoming"). The remedial approach
also informs the recent "state-centered" model under which cross-border refugee flows
are avoided by intervening to rectify abuses or creating in-state protection zones. See
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, State-centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Contain-
ment, 14 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 120 (1992) (describing and evaluating this development);
Martin, supra note 1 (same).
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These three aspects of nonrefoulement obligations are not mutually
exclusive, and do not exhaust the conceivable alternatives. They afford,
however, varied insights into an individual's claim on a state that threat-
ens refoulement. As examples will illustrate, the adoption of one ap-
proach to the exclusion of the others may lead to different conclusions
regarding the scope of a state's duty of nonrefoulement.
II. HIGH SEAS INTERDICTION OF REFUGEES AND
SALE V. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC."
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc. highlights the problem of extraterritorial violations of
refugees' rights. In Sale, the Court upheld the Bush-Clinton policy of
intercepting boats off the coast of Haiti and returning their occupants to
Haiti without providing an opportunity for those occupants to demon-
strate their refugee status, despite a challenge based on the statutory
prohibition of refoulement in section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. 2 The majority rested its decision on the conclusion
that neither the statutory prohibition nor the prohibition of refoulement
in the Refugee Convention applied outside the borders of the United
States.
A. THE LIMITS OF SALE13
The Sale decision overturned a Second Circuit ruling that found the
plain language of section 243(h) to preclude any geographical limitation.
The Supreme Court's contrary interpretation resulted in part from its
reading of the legislative history of section 243(h) 14 and in part from
invocation of a presumption against extraterritoriality in statutes." Leg-
islative history provides some support for this interpretation; although
the Refugee Act of 1980, which gave section 243(h) its current signifi-
cance, was generally intended to conform United States statutory law to
the requirements of the Refugee Convention, the consequence most
visibly contemplated was the extension of the refoulement prohibition to
exclusion proceedings. 6
11. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1993).
13. The purpose of the article is not to analyze the Sale decision, but to sketch
it fully enough to provide a background for discussion of issues it left unaddressed.
14. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
15. Id. at 2560, 2567.
16. See id. at 2561, n.33 (citing House and Senate Reports). Exclusion is the
216
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The reliance on a presumption against the extraterritorial application
of statutes, however, was more dubious. The Immigration and Nationali-
ty Act affords a peculiar occasion for invoking this presumption-its
very purpose is to regulate cross-border movement of aliens, and it gov-
erns the activities of an agency with both domestic and overseas offic-
es.' 7 In fact, the majority proved glaringly inconsistent in its treatment
of the presumption against extraterritoriality, drawing upon it to limit the
scope of the refoulement prohibition of section 243(h), but never bring-
ing it to bear on section 212(f) of the same Act,"8 the supposed statuto-
ry basis for the president's establishment of the extraterritorial interdic-
tion program.' This broad reading of a provision which granted the
executive branch power over immigration was hardly unusual. Several
weeks after the Court's decision, a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel up-
held the authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
to conduct law enforcement activities on the high seas on the basis of
the extraterritorial nature of the immigration laws, without mentioning
either the Sale decision or the presumption against extraterritoriality."
process for denying aliens entry into the United States, as opposed to deportation,
which is the process for expelling aliens who have already entered.
17. Id. at 2576-77 (Blackmun, I., dissenting); see 8 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1993) (listing
INS offices in Athens, Bangkok, Calgary, Frankfurt, Freeport, Guadalajara, Hamilton.
Hong Kong, Manila, Mexico City, Monterrey, Montevideo. Montreal, Naples, Nassau,
Ottawa, Palermo, Rome, Seoul, Singapore, Toronto, Vancouver, Victoria, Vienna, and
Winnipeg).
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1993).
19. Sale, 113 S. C. at 2559, 2567. Finding authority for high seas interdiction in
§ 212(0 was, as Justice Blackmun mildly put it. "somewhat of a stretch." Id. at 2573
n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is obvious from the structure of the statute that the
purpose of § 212(f), which authorizes the President to "suspend the entry of all aliens
or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of
aliens any restrictions he may deem appropriate," is to empower the President to
make temporary additions (absolute or conditional) to the list of statutory grounds of
exclusion from the United States contained in § 212. With the single exception of
Haitian interdiction, that is the only purpose for which § 212(0 has ever been used.
Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242, 244
(1981) (stating that § 212(f) has not been used since its enactment until 1981); Proc-
lamation No. 6636, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,525 (1993); Proclamation No. 6574, 58 Fed. Reg.
34,209 (1993); Proclamation No. 6569, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,897 (1993); Proclamation No.
5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988); Proclamation No. 5829, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,289
(1988); Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (1986); Proclamation No. 5377,
50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (1985).
20. United States v. Chen, 2 F.3d 330, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 1558 (1994); see also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 692 (9th Cir.
21719941
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Although the Supreme Court stated in Sale that the "presumption has
special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that
may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has
unique responsibility,"'" it seemed really to be saying that grants of
power to the president are presumptively extraterritorial, while limita-
tions on his power are presumptively not. Nothing in the Supreme
Court's recent case law emphasizing a presumption against extraterri-
toriality has justified a distinction between statutes granting the govern-
ment power and statutes limiting government power. Indeed, the current
vogue for the presumption originated in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.,'2 which rejected the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
efforts to apply federal anti-discrimination laws to a U.S. corporation's
treatment of its U.S. employees abroad.'
The Court also checked its interpretation of section 243(h) against the
prohibition of refoulement in the Refugee Convention. Upon examination
of the negotiating history of the 1951 Convention, the Court claimed
that it found affirmative evidence that Article 33 was not intended to
apply extraterritorially.24 The travaux preparatoires contain a discus-
sion, of ambiguous significance,' which actually relates to a different
issue, whether the prohibition of refoulement includes a prohibition of
rejection at the frontier (i.e., an obligation to admit refugees). The Court
somehow found a territorially limited meaning inherent in the French
verb "refouler,"26 and bolstered this interpretation with citations to early
commentators on the Refugee Convention. 7 The Court added: "A more
1989), (upholding extraterritoriality of criminal immigration statutes) cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1046 (1991).
21. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2567.
22. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
23. This is not to say that one cannot divine an unexplained preference for un-
fettered executive power behind a body of case law that refuses extraterritorial appli-
cation to statutes creating private causes of action, judicial jurisdiction over civil cas-
es, and limitations on executive power, and permits extraterritorial application of crim-
inal statutes and statutes granting executive power.
24. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2565-67.
25. See id. at 2567 (noting that "the significance of the President's comment that
the remarks should be 'placed on record' is not entirely clear"); id. at 2571-72
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record merely documented views of indi-
vidual delegates).
26. Id. at 2563-64.
27. Id. at 2564 nA0 (citing N. ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STA-
TUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENT AND INTERPRETATION 162-63 (1953), and
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1972)).
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recent work describes the evolution of non-refoulement into the interna-
tional (and possibly extraterritorial) duty of non-return relied upon by
respondents, but it also admits that in 1951 non-refoulement had a nar-
rower meaning and did not encompass extraterritorial obligations."'
B. BEYOND SALE
While the Supreme Court upheld the interdiction program in Sale, it
did not provide an unqualified endorsement. Justice Stevens, who wrote
the majority opinion, included some passages that other Justices might
have omitted. He conceded the "moral weight" of the argument "that the
Protocol's broad remedial goals require that a nation be prevented from
repatriating refugees to their potential oppressors whether or not the
refugees are within that nation's borders."' He observed:
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol-like the
drafters of § 243(h)-may not have contemplated that any nation would
gather fleeing refugees and return them to the one country they had des-
perately sought to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of
Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obli-
gations on those who ratify it through no more than its general humani-
tarian intent.'
He concluded the opinion by quoting Judge Harry Edwards' comment
on an earlier phase of the Haitian interdiction controversy: "Although
the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be found in a
judicial remedy."3
Thus, the Court's argument in Sale appears to be technical and
positivistic, rather than a justification of the interdiction program. The
Court focused on nonrefoulement as a particular prohibition embodied in
the 1951 Refugee Convention. It concluded that the drafters of the Con-
vention had neglected to prohibit schemes like high seas interdiction. As
a result, a court could not find interdiction to be a violation of the
United States' obligations under the Protocol. If one accepts this inter-
28. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2564 n.40 (citing G. GOOD\VIN-GILL, THE REFuEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-76 (1983)).
29. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
30. Id. at 2565.
31. Id. at 2567 (quoting Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
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pretation of the Convention,32 then a gap appears in international refu-
gee law that may need to be filled from sources outside the Convention.
Actually, the Court's decision does not necessitate the existence of a
gap; it only determines that the Convention and federal statutes imple-
menting the Convention do not cover high seas interdiction. The 1951
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are not the only international
law sources of nonrefoulement obligations. The decision leaves open the
compatibility of interdiction with other sources of law, including custom-
ary international law33 and other treaties to which the United States
may be a party. This article discusses two examples of other human
rights treaties that impose nonrefoulement obligations: the United Na-
tions Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.'
III. NONREFOULEMENT AND THE TORTURE CONVENTION
The Torture Convention establishes mechanisms designed "to make
more effective the struggle against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment throughout the world."35 It includes, inter
alia, requirements that states prevent their agents from inflicting torture,
32. But see U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to U.S. Supreme
Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 32 I.L.M. 1215 (1993) (stating
that "the obligation not to return refugees to persecution arises irrespective of whether
governments are acting within or outside their borders. . . .UNHCR considers the
Court's decision a setback to modern international refugee law .. ").
33. The plaintiffs in Sale, who were challenging an Executive Order that dis-
pensed with the requirement of inquiries into refugee status before repatriation to
Haiti, did not ask the Court to find that the President was acting in violation of
customary international law, presumably because they expected that the Court would
find that the Executive Order was a "controlling executive act" precluding judicial
enforcement of customary law within the meaning of The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900). See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 115, Reporters' Note 3 (1987) (stating that various Supreme Court statements
suggest that courts will not compel the President to comply with international law);
Agora, May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
913 (1986) (debating the extent of the President's power under this doctrine).
34. This article will not discuss the implications of the Inter-American human
rights system for U.S. nonrefoulement obligations. For an introduction to that system,
see Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY IssUEs 439
(Theodor Meron ed., 1985).
35. Torture Convention, supra note 4, pmbl.
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educate them in their obligations, investigate incidents of torture, com-
pensate victims of torture, and prosecute perpetrators of torture.'
The Torture Convention includes an explicit prohibition of the return
of aliens to countries where they face torture. Article 3(1) provides that
"[n]o State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subject to torture."' This prohibition
shares some common ground with, but is independent of, the
refoulement prohibition of the Refugee Convention. Not every refugee is
fleeing from the prospect of torture, and not every person threatened
with torture is a "refugee" within the meaning of the 1967 Protocol.
In fact, the Torture Convention specifically defines "torture," and its
operative meaning includes an element of official action not normally
present in the definition of torture. Article I defines the term, for pur-
poses of the Convention only," as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having commit-
ted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
36. See J. HERmaN BURGERS & HANS DANEuUS, THE UNrrED NATIONS CON-
VENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PuNIsHMENT 2-3
(1988) (summarizing the substantive provisions of the Torture Convention).
37. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 3. Of course, this protection is not
limited to aliens, but for reasons of context I will emphasize this aspect of the prohi-
bition.
Although the Torture Convention includes provisions requiring protection against
other forms of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." these do not
include a nonrefoulement obligation relative to such treatment or punishment. Id. art.
16(1). The Convention does not, however, purport to contradict nonrefoulement obliga-
tions arising under other sources of law. ld. art. 16(2); see BURGERS & DANELIUS,
supra note 36, at 149-50 (noting that the protection of other international instruments
on the issue of extradition will not be affected by the Convention).
38. See Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(2) (clarifying that the definition
of "torture" is not intended to prejudice the use of other definitions in other con-
texts). The linkage between torture and government action in the Torture Convention
further narrows the definition. See BURGERS & DANELiUS, supra note 36, at 119-20
(explaining that this choice was made because the mechanisms of the Convention
were considered unnecessary for the suppression of private torture).
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include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to
lawful sanctions.39
Most importantly, the definition is not limited to torture inflicted on
grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. Accordingly, an alien's rights under the
Torture Convention do not depend on whether the alien is also a refu-
gee, or on a characterization of the torture as a form of "persecution."
Thus, the Torture Convention does not invite the kind of hair-splitting
over the torturer's motive that the Supreme Court's decision in LN.S. v.
Elias-Zacarias0 has encouraged in the implementation of the United
States refugee laws, and that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
has practiced in a series of recent cases involving Sikhs from India.4
When the United States becomes a party to the Torture Convention,
Article 3 will forbid the BIA to tell an alien, "Sure you're going to be
tortured, but you're not going to be tortured on grounds of political
opinion, so we'll send you back."42
As of this writing, the United States has not yet ratified the Torture
Convention. The Senate gave its consent to ratification in October 1990,
but it postponed ratification until the passage of the criminal legislation
needed to implement the Convention.43 Congress finally enacted the
39. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(1); see infra note 47 and accom-
panying text (noting that the U.S. modification of this definition). The exception for
"lawful sanctions" is somewhat confusing. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 37, at
121-22. The United States, in the reservations, understandings, and declarations that
the Senate attached to its consent to the Convention, takes the position that this sen-
tence does not provide a loophole through which a State Party could eviscerate the
Convention. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Understanding
No. l(c)) (asserting that a State Party could not defeat the object and purpose of the
Convention through its domestic sanctions).
40. 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992) (upholding a BIA decision that a guerilla's threat
to kill represented an effort to coerce enlistment rather than punishment for political
opposition).
41. Matter of R-, Int. Dec. No. 3195 (BIA Dec. 15, 1992), remanded sub nom.
Rana v. Moshorak, No. CV 93-0274-SVW (C.D. Cal. July 15, 1993); Matter of K- S-
, Int. Dec. No. 3209 (BIA Oct. 5, 1993); Chamjit Singh v. lchert, No. C-93-2086-
MHP, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16992 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1993); Harpinder Singh v.
llchert, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16975 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1993).
42. Actually, one does not have to wait for ratification of the Torture Convention
for this prohibition to take effect; such conduct is already a violation of Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See infra text accompanying
notes 68-69.
43. See David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of Interna-
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implementing legislation in April 1994,' but President Clinton has not
yet deposited the instrument of ratification." Ratification is presumably
only a matter of time.
The Senate's consent to ratification included a series of reservations,
understandings and declarations, most of which the administration pro-
posed, that modify or clarify U.S. obligations under the Torture Conven-
tion.4' For example, the understandings specify more fully the definition
of torture 7 More significantly for our purposes, one understanding43
equates the "substantial grounds for believing" standard of article 3 with
the "more likely than not" standard derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in INS v. Stevic 9 This elevation of the burden of proof repre-
sents the United States' only effort to limit its nonrefoulement obliga-
tions under the Torture Convention.
Final ratification of the Convention will therefore require broadening
the practice of avoiding deportation in cases involving probable torture.
This requirement, however, may not be judicially enforceable as such.
No legislation implementing nonrefoulement is contemplated, and the
Senate has declared that substantive provisions of the Torture Conven-
tion are non-self-executing.' Nonetheless, the United States will be
tional Criminal Law within the United States. 15 NOVA L. Ray. 449, 450 & n.4
(1991) (explaining that ratification of the Torture Convention requires implementing
legislation) [hereinafter Stewart, Torture Convention].
44. See Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506, 108 Stat. 463 (adding 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340B).
45. Id.
46. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,486-87 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Pell) (noting that the Senate received the Torture Convention with conditions attached
by the Reagan and Bush Administrations). I will not enter here into the question of
whether these are all valid reservations, or whether some of them are invalid due to
their incompatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention.
47. 136 CONG. REc. S17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Understandings Nos.
1(a)-(e)); Stewart, supra note 43, at 455-56 (explaining the purpose of the Understand-
ings).
48. 136 CONG. REc. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Understanding No. 2);
see Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1990) (testimony of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division) [hereinafter Richard Testimony] (explain-
ing the administration's rationale for modifying the burden of proof); Stewart, Torture
Convention, supra note 43, at 457-58 (same).
49. 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984) (holding that an alien must show that persecu-
tion is more likely than not in order to be protected from refoulement under § 243(h)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
50. See Stewart, Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 467-68 (discussing the
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obligated to comply with Article 3, and responsibility for compliance in
the immigration context will fall to the Attorney General and her dele-
gates." The Attorney General has a variety of discretionary tools avail-
able that she can use to avoid sending aliens back to a country where
torture is likely, including parole,52 prosecutorial discretion, deferred
enforced departure,53 and (in some cases) suspension of deportation.54
Different subordinates within the Justice Department, however, possess
delegated authority to wield these various tools.5 Once the United
States ratifies the Torture Convention, it would be advisable for the At-
torney General to issue regulations clarifying how existing discretion
will be used to comply with Article 3.
Whether the nonrefoulement obligation of the Torture Convention has
a broader territorial scope than that attributed to the Refugee Convention
by the Supreme Court presents a difficult question. The Torture Conven-
tion was opened for signature in December 1984.56 The Supreme Court
decision to declare the Convention non-self-executing). I assume arguendo that the
declaration can suffice to make the treaty non-self-executing. But see Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and
"Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 527 (1991) (arguing that
the Senate cannot defeat the self-executing character of a treaty provision without ade-
quate reason); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate
Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571,
631-32 (1991) (denying any binding character of the declaration that the Torture Con-
vention is not self-executing).
51. See Richard Testimony, supra note 48, at 15 (explaining that "Article 3 plac-
es an obligation upon the competent authorities of the United States not to deliver an
individual to a country where he would be tortured. Under existing law, the compe-
tent authorities for ensuring the execution of this obligation are the Secretary of State
for extradition and the Attorney General for deportation").
52. Parole enables the Attorney General to permit an alien who has not yet "en-
tered" the country in legal terms to enter the country physically. 8 U.S.C. §
I182(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
53. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 610-14, 844 (2d ed. 1991) (characterizing prosecutorial discretion
and deferred enforced departure as administrative tools for postponing, possibly forev-
er, the removal of an alien who has already legally entered).
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988) (permitting the suspension of deportation as
a procedure for granting permanent residence status to aliens who have been in the
country for more than seven years and who would face "extreme hardship" if deport-
ed).
55. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1993) (authorizing INS district directors to grant
parole); 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.1, 3.1(b)(2) (1993) (authorizing immigration judges and the
Board of Immigration Appeals to suspend deportation).
56. Torture Convention, supra note 4, at 197.
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has recognized that the concept of refoulement may have come to em-
brace extraterritorial action by that dateY As one commentary on the
Torture Convention explains, Article 3 "is intended to cover all mea-
sures by which a person is physically transferred to another State."Ss
Because a jus cogens norm of customary international law binding on
all states already prohibits state-condoned torture," law-abiding states
have particularly strong reason to avoid complicity in other states' tor-
ture practices. On the other hand, the language of Article 3 of the Tor-
ture Convention says only "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite," offer-
ing a parallel to the wording "expel or return ('refouler')" in Article 33
of the Refugee Convention.' Some commentators have suggested that
the drafters of the Torture Convention used the term "refouler" in order
to avoid resolving disagreements over the scope of the obligation.6'
Uncertainty about the scope of the nonrefoulement obligation under
the Torture Convention may yet be clarified by international institutions.
Article 17 of the Torture Convention creates a Committee Against Tor-
ture, to which State Parties are obliged to report periodically.' The
Committee also has nonmandatory competence to consider complaints of
57. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2564-65, n.40 (citing G. GOODW1IN-GILL, THE REF-
UGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 74-76 (1983)) (addressing the evolution of non-
refoulement into an extraterritorial obligation).
58. BURGERS & DANEUUS, supra note 36, at 126.
59. See RESTATmMNT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES, § 702 and cmt. n (1987) (identifying torture as a violation of a jus cogens
norm and explaining the consequences); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 36, at I
(stating that the Torture Convention "is based upon the recognition that the above-
mentioned practices are already outlawed under international law").
60. See BURGERS & DANEI.US, supra note 36. at 126 (describing Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention as a source of inspiration). Unlike Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention, however, Article 3 of the Torture Convention has no exception clause
making reference to an alien's posing "danger to the security of the country in which
he is," a factor that the Sale majority considered relevant to determining the territorial
scope of the refoulement prohibition under that Convention. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
But see Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2570 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discounting this argu-
ment).
61. Kay Hailbronner & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Zur Zeichnung der UN-
Folterkonvention durch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1986 EUROPAISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE-ZErrSCHRIFT 641, 643 (1986). These authors were, however, discussing
the question of rejection at the frontier, not the question of return of refugees cap-
tured on the high seas.
62. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 19; see BURGERS & DANE.IUS, supra
note 36, at 156-59 (describing the responsibilities of State Parties to the Committee
under Article 19).
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Convention violations filed by other State Parties or by individual vic-
tims, and to investigate on its own motion indications that torture is
being systematically practiced in the territory of a State Party.63 Al-
though the United States plans to accept the competence of the Com-
mittee to receive complaints from other State Parties (which are unlike-
ly)' and to investigate reports of systematic torture, it does not intend
to accept the competence of the Committee to receive complaints from
individual victims.65 Thus, guidance from the Committee Against Tor-
ture regarding the territorial scope of the nonrefoulement obligation
under Article 3 is more likely to arise in the course of the reporting
procedure or in connection with complaints brought against other signa-
tories rather than in connection with a specific complaint against the
United States.
IV. NONREFOULEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The United States became a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1992. The Covenant is a binding interna-
tional agreement, designed to ensure the observance of traditional civil
and political rights like life, liberty, physical integrity, privacy, equality
before the law, and freedom of thought, conscience and expression, as
63. Torture Convention, supra note 4, arts. 20, 21, 22, 28. See BURGERS &
DANELIUS, supra note 36, at 159-67 (elaborating on the authority given to the Com-
mittee Against Torture under Articles 20, 21, 22, and 28).
64. See Committee on International Human Rights, The Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 REC.
ASS'N BAR CITY N.Y. 235, 248-49 (1987) (noting that State Parties are reluctant to
file complaints under other human rights treaties).
65. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Declaration No. 2)
(recognizing the competence of the Committee Against Torture under Article 21 for
complaints made by a State Party, but not by individual victims); Stewart, Torture
Convention, supra note 43, at 469-70 (explaining that the United States will not rec-
ognize the competence of the Committee to receive individual complaints). The accep-
tance of the Article 20 procedure for investigation on the Committee's own motion
will follow from the absence of a declaration under Article 28 of the Torture Con-
vention. See id. at 469 & n.47 (explaining the effect of Articles 20 and 28). The
United States will also decline to be bound by the Article 30(1) dispute resolution
procedures of the Convention, involving compulsory arbitration and jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice over disputes between State Parties. 136 CONG. REC.
S17,491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Reservation No. 2); see Stewart, Torture Conven-
tion, supra note 43, at 470 (stating that the United States reserves its right not to
follow dispute resolution procedures).
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well as the right of citizens to political participation.' Understanding
the implications of the Covenant for refoulement practices requires a
lengthier series of steps.
The Covenant contains no right of asylum or prohibition of
refoulement in express terms. Rather, specific nonrefoulement obligations
arise in connection with specific human rights that would be violated by
the return of an alien to a country where those rights would be violated.
Such obligations have been recognized particularly in connection with
the right to life (article 6)' and the right not to be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7).
Thus a paradox emerging from the nonrefoulement system of the Tor-
ture Convention-that an alien may be protected against return to the
hands of a torturer, but not against return to the hands of an assas-
sin-is obviated under the Covenant.
A. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE COVENANT
The basic obligation imposed on parties to the Covenant is expressed
in article 2(1) as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status!6
The question thus arises how one should interpret the dual phrasing
"all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." Are
these separate and cumulative requirements, meaning that a state under-
takes no obligations to respect human rights of individuals who are
outside its territory?" Are they alternatives equivalent to "all individ-
uals within its territory and all individuals otherwise subject to its ju-
66. Henkin, supra note 9, at 16-21.
67. See Covenant, supra note 5, art. 6 (providing that "[elvery human being has
the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
68. See id. art. 7 (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment").
69. d art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
70. See Egon Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: The International Measures of
Implementation, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 827, 863 (1968) (adopting this interpretation
without much analysis).
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risdiction"?' Does the language express some other combination of
these two jurisdictional bases?
The drafting history of the Covenant suggests that the dual phrasing
arose as a result of the dual obligation earlier in the sentence "to respect
and to ensure" the enumerated rights.' The obligation to "ensure"
rights under the Covenant means more than just an obligation not to
violate those rights, but rather entails an obligation to protect those
rights from violations by third parties." The drafters added the phrase
"within its territory" to avoid assigning to states the task of affirmatively
protecting persons (e.g., their own nationals) who might be subject to
their jurisdiction but who were in the territory of another state.' That
purpose is consistent with obliging states themselves not to violate the
rights of persons subject to their jurisdiction but outside their territo-
ry.
75
This extraterritorial reading of obligations under the Covenant became
well-established in the case law of the Human Rights Committee long
before the U.S. accession to the Covenant." Two sets of cases, all in-
volving Uruguay, illustrate this interpretation. The first consists of "pass-
port cases," where the state refuses to renew the passports of perceived
political opponents who are outside its territory in order to impair the
opponents' ability to return to their own country or to travel freely
abroad.77 The Human Rights Committee observed that the rights to
71. See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 73-75 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (proposing that the
phrase be read disjunctively).
72. Id. at 74; MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 41-42 (1993).
73. NOWAK, supra note 72, at 36-38.
74. Buergenthal, supra note 71, at 74, 411 n.9; NOWAK, supra note 72, at 41.
75. NOWAK, supra note 72, at 41-43; DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVE-
NANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 181-82 (1991).
76. See A.H. Robertson, The Implementation System: International Measures, in
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 332, 337 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (explaining that the Covenant creates the
Human Rights Committee as the principal international organ to oversee its imple-
mentation). The Committee's General Comments and decisions in individual cases
have become a major source for interpretation of the Covenant. See generally
MCGOLDRICK, supra note 75 (expounding covenant on basis of committee's comments
and decisions); NOWAK, supra note 72 (same).
77. Vidal Martins v. Uruguay (No. 57/1979) (1982), reprinted in Human Rights
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leave any country and to enter one's own country, protected under Arti-
cle 12 of the Covenant, could be vitiated if they imposed no extrater-
ritorial obligations.78
More directly relevant were a pair of cases, decided in 1981, involv-
ing extraterritorial abductions by Uruguayan security forces of Uruguay-
an citizens in neighboring countries.' The Human Rights Committee
stated:
Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party
to respect and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its ter-ritory and
subject to its jurisdiction", but it does not imply that the State party con-
cerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Cove-
nant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether
with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to
it. According to article 5(1) of the Covenant:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or per-
form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and free-
doms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the present Covenant.
In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so interpret the respon-
sibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to per-
petrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.,
Professor Tomuschat appended individual concurring opinions in both
cases, questioning the applicability of Article 5, but agreeing that a cor-
Committee, 1 Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol 122 (1985) [hereinafter
Selected Decisions]; Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay (No. 77/1980) (1983), reprinted in 2
Selected Decisions 102 (1990); Pereira Montero v. Uruguay (No. 10611981) (1983)
reprinted in 2 Selected Decisions 136; Varela Ndifiez v. Uruguay, (No. 10811981)
(1983) reprinted in 2 Selected Decisions 143.
78. Id.
79. See Lpez Burgos v. Uruguay (No. 52/1979) (1981) reprinted in I Selected
Decisions 88, 91 (finding extraterritorial violations of Articles 7 (including torture) and
9(1) (arbitrary arrest and detention), as well as violations in Uruguay of Articles 7.
9(1), 9(3) (trial without unreasonable delay). 14(3)(d) (right to chosen counsel at trial),
14(3)(g) (right against compelled self-incrimination), and 22(1) (right to trade union
activities)); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay (No. 5611979) (1981) reprinted in I
Selected Decisions 92, 94 (finding an extraterritorial violation of article 9(1). as well
as violations in Uruguay of Articles 10(1) (conditions of detention), 14(3)(b) (right to
chosen counsel before trial) and 14(3)(c) (trial without undue delay)).
80. Ltpez Burgos, supra note 79, at 91.
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rect interpretation of Article 2 includes a nation's responsibility for some
activity occurring outside the national boundaries.8
Concededly, these cases involve an abduction of the state's own citi-
zens in foreign territory before they are brought within the state's own
borders and not an abduction of aliens on the high seas preliminary to
forced repatriation. The general principle, however, that a State Party
may not evade its obligation to respect human rights by carrying out its
activities outside its boundaries applies equally to both situations. A
state that "interdicts" vessels on the high seas is exercising jurisdiction
over their occupants, and when it deprives refugees of their freedom to
sail on, and forcibly returns them to their country of origin, it is active-
ly subjecting them to the authority of their oppressors.
B. SOERING IN STRASBOURG
To understand the nonrefoulement consequences of the Covenant, it
would be useful to turn briefly to the European human rights system.
From the U.S. perspective, the European Court of Human Rights deliv-
ered one of its most striking decisions in Soering v. United Kingdom. "
81. Id. at 92. Professor Tomuschat's analysis of Article 2 is too long for the
text, but short enough for the margin:
To construe the words "within its territory" pursuant to their strict literal mean-
ing as excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring beyond the national
boundaries would, however, lead to utterly absurd results. The formula was
intended to take care of objective difficulties which might impede the imple-
mentation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally
unable to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its
citizens abroad, having at its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection
with their limited potential. Instances of occupation of foreign territory offer
another example of situations which the drafters of the Covenant had in mind
when they confined the obligation of State parties to their own territory. All
these factual patterns have in common, however, that they provide plausible
grounds for denying the protection of the Covenant. It may be concluded, there-
fore, that it was the intention of the drafters, whose sovereign discretion cannot
be challenged, to restrict the territorial scope of the Covenant in view of such
situations where enforcing the Covenant would be likely to encounter excep-
tional obstacles. Never was it envisaged, however, to grant states parties unfet-
tered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the
freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad. Consequently,
despite the wording of article 2(1), the events which took place outside Uru-
guay come within the purview of the Covenant.
It is unclear how much significance Tomuschat attributed to the fact that the victims
were the state's own citizens.
82. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (ser. A) (1989).
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The court prevented the United Kingdom's extradition of a capital de-
fendant to the United States because the extradition would expose him
to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the United States.' The
case has sparked a great deal of comment" and has importance for this
article both in its general propositions on human rights and in its influ-
ence on U.S. reservations to the Covenant.'
Jens Soering was an eighteen year old West German student attending
the University of Virginia when he and his girlfriend killed her parents
in March 1985.' The pair then fled to England, where they were ar-
rested on other charges.' Subsequently, the United States requested
extradition for trial back in Virginia.' The European Court of Human
Rights viewed the proposed extradition as a violation of Article 3 of the
European Human Rights Convention, which provides that "[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment."89 It concluded that the death penalty itself did not necessarily
constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within the
meaning of the Convention." Nonetheless, it believed that after a capi-
tal sentence in Virginia, U.S. procedures would likely subject Soering to
the "death row phenomenon,"'" which it described as confinement in a
strict custodial regime for many years under "the anguish and mounting
tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death." In view of
83. Id. at 44-45. Ultimately, the UK extradited Soering after the United States
gave assurances that it would not impose the death penalty; he was convicted of both
murders and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment. Va. Court Upholds Murder
Convictions, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at D7.
84. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L 128
(1991); Michael P. Shea, Note, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Ex-
tradition Cases after Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85 (1992); Colin Warbrick, Coher-
ence and the European Court of Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background to the
Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1073 (1990); Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E.
Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 Micil. J. INT'L L 845
(1990).
85. Infra note 121 and accompanying text.
86. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-12.
87. id. at 11.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
90. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) at 39-41.
91. ld. at 41.
92. Id. at 42.
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Soering's age and disturbed mental state,93 and the practical alternative
of extraditing him for trial in Germany (where there is no death penal-
ty)' the Court concluded that extradition to the United States would
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.95
The United States, of course, is not a party to the European Human
Rights Convention, and the Court emphasized that it was not adjudicat-
ing U.S. conduct.96 Rather, it stated, "in so far as any liability under
the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the
extraditing state by reason of its having taken action which has as direct
consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment."'
The Court explained:
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Conven-
tion, that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom, and
the rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State
knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were sub-
stantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradi-
tion in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief
and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit
and intention of the Article, and in the Court's view this inherent obli-
gation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would
be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article.9"
This principle of the state's responsibility for the foreseeable conse-
quences of handing over an individual to a country where he fears mis-
treatment was not an innovation in European human rights jurisprudence.
For decades, the European Commission of Human Rights had treated
article 3 as prohibiting extradition or deportation to a country where an
alien faces serious human rights violations." Since Soering, the Europe-
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id. at 44. German criminal law extends to murders committed by German
nationals outside Germany. Id.
95. Id. at 44-45.
96. Id. at 32-36.
97. Id. at 36. The Court did not accept the sweeping principle that an individual
can never be sent to a country without confidence that the conditions awaiting him
fully accord with every provision of the Convention. Id. at 33-34. The Court empha-
sized that it was the fundamental nature of the absolute and nonderogable prohibition
in Article 3 that barred the extradition. Id. at 34-35.
98. Id. at 35.
99. Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
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an Court of Human Rights has also confirmed that the same reasoning
applies to the foreseeable consequences of a deportation."0
C. NONREFOULEMENT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
The principle that refoulement of refugees to a country where they
face inhuman or degrading treatment-or worse-violates a state's obli-
gation not to subject individuals to such treatment also figures in the
Human Rights Committee's interpretation of the Covenant. The
Committee stated its position clearly in 1992 in its General Comment
No. 20 on the prohibition of torture:
In the view of the Committee, States parties must not expose individuals
to the danger of torture or cruel. inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expul-
sion or refoulement. States parties should indicate in their reports what
measures they have adopted to that end.''
The Human Rights Committee recently analyzed the interaction of Arti-
cles 6 and 7 with the extradition process in Kindler v. Canada," a
Dec. & Rep. 158 (1984); Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 10308183,
36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 231-32 (1983); X. v. Federal Republic of
Germany, App. No. 1802/62, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.L 462, 480 (Eur. Comm'n
on H.R.).
100. See Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1991) (Plenary
Court) (finding, by an eighteen-to-one vote, no violation on the facts): Vilvarajah v.
United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1991) (finding, by an eight-to-one
vote, no violation on the facts).
101. General Comment No. 20, 1 9 (April 3, 1992) (Prohibition of torture), re-
printed in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies at 29, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/I (1992). The General
Comment on the position of aliens may express a similar interpretation, but it does so
less clearly. See General comment No. 15 5 (1986), reprinted in Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies at 29, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (1992). "The Covenant does not recognize the
right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party. It is in principle a
matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory. However, in certain
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the covenant even in relation to
entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition
of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise." See also Ines Torres v. Fin-
land, No. 291/1988 (Hum. Rts. Comm. 1990), reprinted in Report of the Hum. Rts.
Comm., 45th Sess., at 96, U.N. Doec. A/45/40, Vol. I (1990) (rejecting, on the facts.
the claim that extradition to Spain violated Article 7 due to the likelihood of torture).
102. Comm. No. 470/1991, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 48th Sess., at
138, U.N. Doc. A/48/40, Vol. 11 (1993).
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rough parallel to Soering. Joseph Kindler, a U.S. citizen, had escaped
from prison and fled to Canada after his conviction for capital murder
and kidnapping in Pennsylvania. 3 The Canadian Minister of Justice
decided to extradite Kindler to the United States without seeking assur-
ances that the U.S. would not impose the death penalty.'" The Su-
preme Court of Canada upheld this decision as consistent with the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.0 Kindler then challenged the
extradition before the Human Rights Committee, alleging, inter alia, that
the death penalty would violate his right to life, that it was cruel and
inhuman, and that conditions awaiting him on death row were cruel,
inhuman and degrading."° The majority of the Committee found no
violation on the merits,"° but viewed Canada's obligations as depend-
ing on the treatment Kindler would receive as a result of his extradition
to the United States. 0
8
In its analysis of the admissibility of the communication, the Commit-
tee majority observed:
Article 2 of the Covenant requires States parties to guarantee the rights of
persons within their jurisdiction. If a person is lawfully expelled or extra-
dited, the State party concerned will not generally have responsibility
under the Covenant for any violations of that person's right that may later
occur in the other jurisdiction. In that sense a State party clearly is not
required to guarantee the rights of persons within another jurisdiction.
However, if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its
jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that the
person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction,
the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That follows
from the fact that a State party's duty under article 2 of the Covenant
would be negated by the handing over of a person to another State
(whether a State party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary
to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose of the handing over. For
example, a State party would itself be in violation of the Covenant if it
handed over a person to another State in circumstances in which it was
foreseeable that torture would take place."°
103. Kindler, Comm. No. 470/1991, 1, 2.1.
104. Id. 1 2.3.
105. Kindler v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.Ct. Canada 1991).
106. Id.
107. Id. 18.
108. Id. 15.3.
109. Id. 6.2.
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Thus, the Human Rights Committee agreed with the court's analysis
in Soering that the prohibition of torture and lesser forms of inhuman
and degrading treatment entailed an obligation not to return an alien to
a country where a sufficient risk of such treatment existed."' In reach-
ing the merits, however, the Committee majority distinguished Soering
with regard to particular factors that had led to the court's conclusion
that the "death row phenomenon" would amount to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment of the individual."' The Committee also reiterated its
own prior decision that prolonged detention on death row, pending post-
conviction remedies, would not ordinarily constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment within the meaning of the Covenant."
The Committee also examined the merits of Kindler's contention that
extradition violated his right to life."' It emphasized that the proceed-
ing concerned:
Nlot whether Mr. Kindler's rights have been or are likely to be violated
by the United States which is not a party to the Optional Protocol, but
whether by extraditing Mr. Kindler to the United States Canada exposed
him to a real risk of a violation of his right under the Covenant."'
The majority concluded that the continued existence of the death penalty
in the United States, within the limits tolerated by Article 6(2) of the
110. The level of probability contemplated by the Committee as engaging the
state's responsibility is not clear, some portions of the text quoted above suggest fore-
seeability as the standard, whereas other portions suggest certainty or purpose. While
analyzing Kindler's situation, the majority looked for a "real risk of a violation" of
Article 6. Id 14.3. Additionally, a separate opinion offered a standard requiring a
showing of "reasonable cause to believe that such violations would probably occur."
Id. app. A 4 (Mr. Kurt Hemdl and Mr. Waleed Sadi, dissenting from finding of
admissibility).
111. Id 15.3 (citing as relevant factors for consideration age, mental state, con-
ditions in state prison, and absence of another state to which the government could
extradite the defendant).
112. Id 15.2 (citing Martin v. Jamaica, Comm. No. 31711988 (Hum. Rts.
Comm. 1993)); Reid v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 25011987. 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 85, 11.6, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990); Pratt & Morgan v.
Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 210/1986, 44th Sess.. at 222. 13.6.
U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
113. Kindler, Comm. No. 470/1991, 13.1.
114. Id The reference to the Optional Protocol concerns the procedure by which
individuals who believe that a state party has violated rights under the Covenant may
bring their cases before the Human Rights Committee. See NOWAK, supra note 72, at
647-49. The United States unlike Canada, has not consented to the committee's re-
ceipt of such communications.
1994]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Covenant, would not give rise to a violation of Kindler's rights against
Canada under Article 6(1) of the Covenant."5
Although some of the Committee's analysis of the Article 6 issue was
written, like the Soering case and like its General Comment No. 20, in
terms of the state's obligation not to expose an individual to a violation
of his rights, other portions stressed Canada's express obligation under
Article 6(1) to protect the right to life. The second sentence of Article
6(1) provides that the right to life "shall be protected by law."'" 6
Moreover, the majority explicitly stated:
The starting point for an examination of this issue must be the obligation
of the State party under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, namely,
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the Covenant."7
These passages reflect a different way of looking at the state's
nonrefoulement obligation. The emphasis on exposure to violations of
rights treats refoulement as an affirmative state action, engaging the
state's responsibility for the resulting violation, and recalling the state's
obligation under Article 2 to respect (i.e., not violate or participate in
violation of) human rights. The emphasis on protection against violations
treats refoulement as a failure of state action, falling short of the state's
obligation under Article 2 to ensure human rights. Nothing in the
115. Kindler, Comm. No. 470/1991, g[ 14.3-14.4. Article 6(1) of the Covenant
guarantees the right to life, requires its protection, and prohibits arbitrary deprivation
of life. Covenant, supra note 5, art. 6(1). Article 6(2) of the Covenant provides limits
for those states that retain the death penalty. Id. art. 6(2). The death penalty may
only be imposed for the most serious crimes according to the law effective at the
time of the crime. Id. Furthermore, the death penalty may only be imposed after a
final decision by a competent court. Id.
Accordingly, the majority held, "[i]f Mr. Kindler had been exposed through
extradition from Canada, to a real risk of a violation of Article 6, Paragraph 2, in
the United States, that would have entailed a violation by Canada of its obligations
under article 6(1)." Kindler, Comm. No. 470/1991, 1 14.3. Several members of the
Committee argued in dissent that Canada, as a state that had abolished the death
penalty, could not claim the benefit of article 6(2), and was obliged under article 6(l)
not to extradite Kindler without seeking assurances that the United States would not
impose the death penalty, regardless of whether the United States remained within the
limits of article 6(2). Id. app. B (Mr. Bertil Wennergren, dissenting); id. app. C,
3.3 (Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah, dissenting); id. app. D (Mr. Fausto Pocar, dissenting); id.
app. E (Ms. Christine Chanet, dissenting); id. app. F (Mr. Francisco Jose Aguilar
Urbina, dissenting).
116. Covenant, supra note 5, art. 6(1).
117. Kindler, Comm. No. 470/1991, 1 13.1 (emphasis added).
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Kindler case required the Human Rights Committee to choose between
these interpretations. The variation between the two phrasings suggests
that its members may not have focused on the distinction.
As parallel ways of thinking about refoulement, these alternative
interpretations supplement each other. The Kindler case then doubly
reinforces the conclusion that deporting an alien to a country where he
faces extrajudicial killing would violate Article 6 of the Covenant and
that deporting an alien to a country where he faces torture, or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment would violate Article 7
of the Covenant. In either case, there would be no need to show perse-
cution on one of the five Refugee Convention grounds.
It is conceivable, however, that these interpretations are not alterna-
tives, but rather that the interpretation emphasizing the protection of
human rights excludes an emphasis on avoiding exposure to violations
as a consequence of the obligation to respect human rights. If this were
taken to be the correct interpretation of the Covenant and if the obliga-
tions to respect and to ensure human rights have different territorial
application, then it might be concluded that the obligations of
nonrefoulement under Articles 6 and 7 apply only within a state's terri-
tory, and not to all persons otherwise within the state's jurisdiction.
D. U.S. ADHERENCE AND RESERVATIONS
TO THE COVENANT
The United States has already adhered to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. President Carter originally sent the Cove-
nant to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1978. "8 President
Bush renewed the request for Senate action in August 1991,"9 and the
Senate gave its consent on April 2, 1992." The United States deposit-
ed its instrument of ratification on June 8, 1992, and the Covenant has
been in force for the United States since September 8, 1992.2'
The scope of U.S. obligations under the Covenant, however, must be
understood in light of the series of reservations, understandings and
declarations with which the United States qualified its ratification.'"
118. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CiVIL AND PotmcAL Ri;rTs. SEN. ExEc.
REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992) [hereinafter SN. EXEC. REP.I.
119. Id
120. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
121. John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United
States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 59, 60 nn.12-13 (1993).
122. 138 CONG. REC. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); David P. Stewart. U.S.
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While there are doubts about the validity of some of these reservations,
understandings and declarations, or about their binding character,'' this
article assumes arguendo that they successfully modify the United
States' obligations, and examines how the modifications affect the ter-
ritorial and extraterritorial nonrefoulement obligations under the Cove-
nant.
The second reservation addresses U.S. obligations regarding the right
to life.'24 According to the reservation, the United States reserves the
right to impose the death penalty on any person convicted in accordance
with the law, including minors, but excluding pregnant women."z This
reservation shields capital punishment policy in the United States from
Article 6 of the Covenant, including its prohibition on executing persons
who committed crimes as juveniles2 6 and its limitation of the death
penalty to "the most serious crimes."'2" The reservation, however, re-
lates solely to lawful capital punishment in the United States. There is
no reservation, understanding, or declaration limiting U.S. obligation to
protect individuals against murder within the United States' or its re-
sponsibility not to hand refugees over to a foreign country where they
face extrajudicial murder. 29
There is no reservation, understanding or declaration limiting U.S.
obligations with regard to torture under Article 7.130 The third reserva-
tion addresses the prohibition against "cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment" under article 7 as follows:
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77 (1993) [herein-
after Stewart, US Ratification].
123. Quigley, supra note 121, at 5 nn.32-41; Ved P. Nanda, The United States
Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1311, 1331-32 (1993).
124. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Reservation No. 2).
125. Id.
126. Covenant, supra note 5, art. 6(5); SEN. EXEC. REP., supra note 133, at 11;
see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the death penalty for
crimes committed by persons at age 17).
127. Covenant, supra note 5, art. 6(2); SEN. EXEC. REP., supra note 118, at 11.
128. 138 CONG. REc. 54783 (daily ed. April 2, 1992).
129. Id. In fact, the reservations may not even exclude a U.S. obligation, not to
extradite individuals to countries where they face the death penalty for a capital crime
committed while under eighteen years of age. Id.
130. See id. (listing the Reservations to the adoption of the Covenant).
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That the United states considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent
that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibite4 by the Fifth, Eighth,
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.13'
This reservation was motivated by international decisions like Soering,
holding that the "death row phenomenon" was or could be cruel, inhu-
man or degrading. The legislative history makes clear that the Bush
Administration's attention to the interpretations of the Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, and its desire to
leave room for capital punishment, corporal punishment, and solitary
confinement.'
The reservation to Article 7 appears ambiguous. Does it mean that the
United States considers itself bound only to respect and ensure the right
of individuals not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or pun-
ishment when that treatment would violate the listed amendments to the
Constitution? Or does it mean that the United States considers itself
bound only to respect and ensure the right of individuals not to be
subjected to treatment or punishment that, if carried out by official
action in the United States, would amount to the cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment prohibited by the listed amendments? Unlike
the provisions of the Torture Convention, Article 7 of the Covenant, in
conjunction with the undertakings clause of Article 2, requires the state
to protect individuals against mistreatment by non-state actors." The
United States has not attempted to limit its obligation under article 7 to
131. Id. (Reservation No. 3).
132. See SEN. EXEC. REP., supra note 118, at 12 (providing the administration's
"Explanation of Proposed Reservations, Understandings and Declarations"); Stewart. US
Ratification, supra note 122 (explaining Reservation No. 3). The Senate adopted a
similar reservation to the Torture Convention, which has, in addition to its provisions
regarding torture, provisions regarding cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (listing Reservation
No. I to the Torture Convention). The Torture Convention does not, however, prohibit
refoulement to a country where an individual faces the danger of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment that does not rise to the level of torture.
133. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20. 1 2 (April 3. 1992)
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies at 29, U.N. Doe. HRI/GEN/I (1992) ("Finally, it is
the duty of public authorities to ensure protection by the law against such treatment
even when committed by persons acting outside or without any official authority.");
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 7, 2 (July 27, 1982).
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protect individuals against private torture, nor has it generally used
reservations, understandings or declarations to limit its obligations to
state action under other articles of the Covenant. Thus, it would appear
that the reservation is intended, as its language indicates, to identify
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" with the kinds of
treatment or punishment forbidden to the federal and state governments
by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments, without otherwise
limiting the scope of U.S. obligations under Article 7.
If this interpretation of the reservation is correct, then the reserva-
tions, understandings and declarations do not address the nonrefoulement
obligations of the United States under Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.
Even if this interpretation is incorrect, nothing in the reservations, under-
standings and declarations limits the nonrefoulement obligation under
those articles in cases of extrajudicial murder or torture. It is interesting
that despite the Bush Administration's attention to the Soering case in
preserving the prerogative of the United States to subject prisoners to
the "death row phenomenon" at home, no attention was paid to the
nonrefoulement implications of Articles 6 and 7.' This would seem to
be equally true of territorial and extraterritorial nonrefoulement obliga-
tions. The Human Rights Committee's confirmation of the extraterritorial
applicability of the Covenant long antedated the proceedings leading to
the ratification of the Covenant under the Bush Administration. None of
the reservations, understandings, or declarations purports to limit the
territorial scope of the United States' obligations.
The consequences for administrative action are similar to the conse-
quences of the Torture Convention, except that the Covenant is already
in force for the United States. The Senate has declared the Covenant to
be non-self-executing, meaning to exclude the judicial enforcement of
the Covenant as such. 3' The effect of this declaration has been disput-
ed,"'36 but in any case it does not affect the Attorney General's authori-
134. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-19 (1992) (setting forth
Administration testimony, which failed to mention refoulement issues). Moreover, in
view of this silence, it is difficult to see how the United States could justify applying
the "more likely than not" standard of Stevic to its nonrefoulement obligations under
the Covenant.
135. 138 CONG. REc. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Declaration No. 1); see
Stewart, supra note 122, at 79 (explaining that the declaration clearly states that do-
mestic implementation of the Covenant will lie solely with Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch).
136. Quigley, supra note 121, at 63; Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Exec-
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ty and responsibility to use existing discretionary powers to safeguard
the United States from violating the Covenant. The nonrefoulement
obligations of the Covenant go beyond those that the United States will
have under the Torture Convention, to include cases where aliens face
extrajudicial murder. They probably also include cases where aliens
face forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that
do not rise to the level of torture. Since the Covenant has been in force
for the United States since September 1992, the Attorney General should
hasten to instruct her subordinates in a preferred means for compliance
with these obligations.
CONCLUSION
If the United States is going to reach out beyond its borders to sub-
ject aliens to its jurisdiction, whether through high seas interdiction or
by other methods, their human rights against the United States should
also extend beyond those borders to limit that exercise of power. The
U.S. Supreme Court in Sale permitted executive powers read into the
Immigration and Nationality Act to extend beyond U.S. borders without
accompanying rights; but it did so on highly positivistic grounds, while
recognizing the morally questionable character of the conduct it upheld.
Both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
against Torture contain nonrefoulement obligations that will bind the
United States as a matter of positive law. The Covenant may provide
the best hope among the positive law bases for restoring the proper
relation between jurisdiction and rights.
utive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 1257 (1993); Hurst Hannum, Conchding Observations, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1405 (1993).
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